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Abstract
If an economy runs a current account (CA) deficit and finances it
via a corresponding net inflow of equity capital the external debt (ED)
of the country does not change, i.e.: the CA deficit does not add to
ED. This is no paradox and simply comes from the definition of CA
deficit and ED and points to different degrees of sustainability of CA
deficits according to the way they are financed and to the composition
of the CA itself.
By the evaluation of the determinants of interest rates spreads
vis à vis US lending rates we assess the sustainability of CA deficits
finding that FDI net inflows (proxy of equity capital) allow emerging
economies to sustain imbalances larger with respect to CA deficits
financed by inflows of more liquid assets. Equity capital as a way
to finance the CA, not contributing to the ED, affects the solvency
assessment of a country.
JEL Classification: E44, F34
Keywords: Equity capital, FDI, CA deficit, external debt.
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1 Introduction
History and literature tell happy end stories and tragedies brought about
by current account (CA) imbalances and external debt (ED) of countries.
Australia, Canada, Norway have run for decades CA deficits with no external
crisis. South Korea, Indonesia, Thailand, between 1997 and 1998, and other
countries involved in systemic crisis of the 1990s and 2000s paid a high price
for CA deficits, despite the robustness of their economies, the low levels of
imbalances and the short time during which external disequilibria occurred.
Several interpretations have been put forward to account for these diver-
gent destinies. Most point to the short term financial exposition of countries
and banks governance (Özmen, 2005) and to other structural features such as
the weakness of financial institutions (Hahm, 2004) or unsustainable growth
rates.
Recent literature (Beim and Calomiris, 2001; Lane, 2004, 2005; Lane and
Milesi - Ferretti, 2005a, 2005b; Tang, 2006) investigates the sustainability
of CA imbalances, focusing on the composition of CA and the way CA im-
balances is financed. Great attention has been paid to capital income flows
(interest and dividends) as signals of the sustainability of the ED, since the
“financial items” of the CA provide hints as to the returns on gross foreign
assets. This is a promising route to investigate the riskiness of a country and
its international financial position. We proceed along this path concentrat-
ing on the role of equity capital flows and, in particular, FDI in emerging
countries.
Equity capital and equity securities receive a particular treatment in the
accounting of ED and this makes the effect of FDI, largely made by equity
capital, on the solvency of a country rather special. Flows of FDI and equi-
ties, are recorded in the financial account (FA) of the balance of payments
(BOP). But they do not contribute to the ED (IMF, 2000; 2003, chapter 2).
Consider the following example. First, suppose that the CA of Uganda
shows a deficit of 10 $. Secondly, Uganda has a FA surplus of 10 $, entirely
due to net equity1 inflow. Then, the BOP of Uganda is in equilibrium.
Neither the exchange rate (ER) should move, in the case of flexible ER,
nor foreign exchange reserve (FER) should vary, in the case of fixed ER.
1FDI includes roughly two kinds of flows: equities providing a company share larger
than 10% and greenfield investment financing, that takes place when, for instance, a new
plant of a Multinational firm is built in a foreign country. The first kind of flow does not
enter the ED, while the second does.
3
Page 3 of 21
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
What happens to the ED? Nothing, since it stays constant and does not
change as a result of the net inflow of 10 $ to buy Uganda equities. This
inflow does not contribute to the ED of Uganda (IMF, 1993; 2000; 2003).
The 10 $ worth equities in the hands of foreigners are a liability of Uganda.
Nonetheless, these foreign liabilities do not contribute to the ED of Uganda.
On the contrary, suppose Uganda had an inflow of 10 $ due to the purchase
by foreigners of treasury Bonds of Uganda. The effect on the BOP would be
the same. Yet, the ED of Uganda has worsened by 10 $, while before, with
equities, it did not change.
Foreign inflows to buy equities do not affect the ED of an economy. What
is the rationale of this seemingly inexplicable statistical taxonomy? It comes
from the very nature of equities. In particular, FDI may finance with foreign
funds the acquisition by a non-resident of a chunk of real capital (equity)
which may not be much liquid and not immediately tradable (Rossini and
Zanghieri, 2003). An equity does not imply a strict obligation to pay some-
body back at any given date.
In extreme cases, the equilibrium of the BOP with recurrent CA deficits,
may be secured by selling equities to foreigners. A country may run CA
deficits for prolonged periods if inflows of equity capital finance it, as they
do not impinge upon the ED.
Equity flows go into two distinct categories of the FA. The first is FDI,
made up of two items: flows of “Equity Capital and Reinvested Earnings”
and “Other Capital.” The second is Portfolio Investment, whose components
are “Equity securities” and “Debt Securities”. The problem is that the ac-
counting distinction between “Equity Capital and Reinvested Earnings” and
“Other Capital” is not so clear-cut and may give rise to statistical misrecord-
ing.
The fact that a large portion of FDI does not add to the ED, will make
the assessment of sustainability dependent upon the weight of FDI in the
FA2.
Given all above considerations, our aim is to evaluate the relevance of
FDI for the sustainability of CA deficits and the effect of FDI on variables
signaling the degree of stress of the external position.
The paper is made up of two sections and an epilogue. In the next section
2For the particular nature of FDI and its influence of the saving available in an economy,
see also Rossini and Zanghieri (2003) in a different perspective within the "Feldstein -
Horioka puzzle" literature.
4
Page 4 of 21
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
we go through solvency questions and the role of FDI. In the third section
we dwell on econometric testing, while conclusions are in the epilogue.
2 A reassessment of solvency
Liquidity and solvency crises are often associated (Milesi-Ferretti and Razin,
1996) but they do not necessarily coincide. During systemic crisis, as in Asia
(1997-1998), liquidity was the culprit. Solvency was not an issue except for
Indonesia. Economies involved had liquid foreign liabilities and less liquid
foreign assets, despite sustainable ED.
The equity paradox mentioned above impacts the solvency of a country.
With inflows of equities, and in particular FDI, a country may be solvent
while not liquid. With low equity flows it may be liquid but insolvent. Our
view is that a solvent country is less risky than a liquid one: financial and
monetary variables should reflect this.
We reassess solvency by extension of usual approaches (Obsfeld and Ro-
goff, 1996) to the determination of ratios that signal distress of the ED of an
economy.
A signal of solvency is a stable ratio of ED over the GDP: agents are
comfortable with stable ratios since they provide cushion for variability. We
embrace this view even though it may not be entirely justified on theoretical
grounds. We see whether proper accounting3 of equity flows - proxied by
FDI - alters the ratio adopted in the literature and in policy evaluation.
We use the intertemporal budget constraint (IBC) of an open economy, as
in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996). We assume that expenditure is made up of
consumption (Cs) and investment (Is) flows. Then the IBC, over an infinite
horizon, is:
∞∑
s=t
(
1
1 + r
)s−t(Cs + Is) =
= (1 + r)Bt + (1− r)Ft +
∞∑
s=t
(
1
1 + r
)s−t [Ys + (Fs+1 − Fs)(1− r)] (1)
3Adopted by international standards of the IMF (IMF, 1993; 2000; 2003) and the World
Bank (World Bank, 2005).
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where r stands for the common return on foreign assets (and liabilities)
entirely repatriated each year4. Bt is the net stock of foreign financial assets
(short and long term) at time t that contributes to the ED5. Ft is the stock of
home equities held by foreigners6 and represent a liability. But a special one,
since they do not contribute to the ED, while they can be used to finance
CA deficits. This is the core paradox of this paper.
The left hand side of (1) is the present value (PV) of aggregate expendi-
ture.
The right hand side gives available resources. The first part is the stock
of net foreign assets at the end of t, i.e.: (1 + r)Bt. The second part is the
stock of equities held by foreigners Ft multiplied by (1− r), since dividends
are repatriated. This stock is a liability that may be used to pay imports by
“selling capital.” The third part shows the PV of future production (Ys) and
equity sale flows to foreigners (Fs+1 − Fs).
Then we can write:
−(1 + r)Bt − (1− r)Ft =
∞∑
s=t
(
1
1 + r
)s−t [Ys − Cs − Is + (Fs+1 − Fs)(1− r)] .
(2)
By standard notation (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1996) the Trade Balance flow
is:
TBs = Ys − Cs − Is, (3)
while the “augmented” Trade Balance, including all resources that can be
sold to foreigners, is:
TRs = TBs + (Fs+1 − Fs)(1− r). (4)
Then we can write
−(Bt + Ft)− r(Bt − Ft) =
∞∑
s=t
(
1
1 + r
)s−tTRs, (5)
4This assumes away transaction costs which give rise to asymmetries between countries
with CA surpluses vis à vis those with deficits (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2000).
5This stock gives a return r per period and, therefore, it is multiplied by 1+ r. In-
ternational borrowing or lending may occur at any t consistently with the IBC. If Bt is
negative it is a liability.
6Assets could be valued either at the acquisition price (or book value) or at their
current value. The current price is not the value that the owner can obtain when selling
if he has a large amount of the asset or if other agents follow him. Ft ∈ [0,∞).
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which is a stock - flow relationship.
Financial markets are keen on a stable ratio of ED on GDP as sign of low
country risk. What is the cost of compliance with this requirement? Assume
that GNP grows at a constant rate g. For a steady ED/GNP ratio Bt must
grow at the same speed g. In our scheme the increase in ED can be financed
also via the “augmented” trade balance7:
Bs+1 −Bs = gBs = rBs + TRs = (6)
= rBs + TBs + (Fs+1 − Fs)(1− r)
or
TBs = −(r − g)Bs − (Fs+1 − Fs)(1− r). (7)
Dividing both sides by YS we get:
TBs
Ys
=
−(r − g)Bs − (Fs+1 − Fs)(1− r)
Ys
. (8)
The usual definition of the burden of ED changes. The novelty? Trade sur-
plus that a country needs to transfer in steady state to foreigners is reduced
by equity inflows8. This alters the sustainability assessment of ED. We shall
see empirically, in the next section, that equities make a difference. A country
is more solvent the higher are equity sales to foreigners.
Equity sales reduce trade surpluses to pay back ED. Coeteris paribus, CA
deficits have different effects on country risk according to the share of equity
in their financing.
3 The empirical evaluation
Literature has provided measures of distress of ED (Beim and Calomiris,
2001; Manasse, Roubini and Schimmelpfennig, 2003; Ghosh and Ghosh,
2002). Widely used is the spread (SPR) between long term rates of in-
terest in leading financial markets, i.e. the US, and those of the area under
scrutiny. Since data on long term rates are not available for many emerging
7Consider an example: Bs+1 = −105;Bs = −100; gBs = −5; rBs = −10.
Then the amount of resources to transfer to foreigners to keep a stable ED/Y ratio is
equal to TRs = +5.
8Notice that ED is a negative BS. Therefore Fs+1−Fs reduces the transfer to foreigners
to keep ED stable.
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countries, we resort to lending rates. Emerging countries with ailing CAs
over a long time span show higher interest rates9. Even if there is no risk
of sovereign default on external obligations, sheer international transaction
costs put a wedge between the buying and selling price of saving on inter-
national markets. This is the SPR in interest rates that makes CA deficits
costly for emerging countries (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2000).
SPR is determined by the hindrances an economy faces as far as external
accounts and imagine are concerned. Our aim is to see to what extent SPR
is affected by FDI inflows and whether FDI is able to affect the signaling
variable. Our prior is that SPR - the signal - decreases with larger net
inflows of FDI. The adopted explanatory variable is net FDI inflow over the
GDP i.e.: NFDI / GDPN in nominal terms. The higher is this variable the
lower should be SPR.
Nonetheless, other variables jointly determine SPR.
The second variable is the relative inflation rate vis à vis the US, i.e.:
INFL. We introduce INFL since we should compare real interest rates spreads.
Inserting, among the explanatory variables of interest rates spread, INFL is
equivalent to compare real interest rates spreads.
As a third variable, we use an indicator of growth of money supply (M2)
called GRMON. Lougani and Swagel (2001) employ vector autoregressions
(VARs) to study 53 developing countries between 1964 and 1998. They es-
timate VARs with the following variables: (i) money growth and exchange
rates; (ii) the output gap and a measure of the world business cycle; (iii)
changes in the price of oil and non-oil commodities; (iv) past realizations of
inflation. Their findings suggest that either money growth or exchange rate
movements - depending on the ordering - explain two-thirds of the variance
of both short and long run inflation and, therefore, nominal interest rates.
Moreover, money dynamics is commonly used in constructing leading indica-
tors for inflation (Binner et al., 1999). Then, we expect that a larger money
supply increases SPR.
The fourth variable is the ratio of Foreign Exchange Reserves over ED,
i.e.: TRES/EXDB. The higher this ratio the lower should be SPR. A country
is less liable to incur in liquidity crisis. The larger is the amount of reserves,
vis à vis ED, the higher is the ability to pay back short term obligations.
9This occurs also within quite homogeneous areas. For instance, transition in Eastern
Europe began some 15 years ago, but nominal and real convergence has been achieved by
quite few countiries ( Kasman, Kirbas-Kasman, Turgutlu, 2005).
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The fifth variable is the terms of trade, TOT, signaling competitiveness
and, therefore, ability to pay back ED.
The sixth variable is a measure of health of real external accounts. It is
the CA balance relatively to GDP (CAR). It is a prime indicator of a country
economic imbalance on its foreign relationships. The better is the CA, the
lower will be SPR.
The seventh variable is a dummy, DLATAM, to separate Latin America
from other areas. In that region specific sustainability criteria are adopted
both by the countries themselves and by international investors.
The eighth variable is lagged real GDP in Logs, to capture the ability to
grow and, therefore, to produce sufficient resources to pay back, via trade
surpluses, ED.
Other explanatory variables are presented in the specific econometric ex-
ercise in which they are used.
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3.1 TEST 1
In the first test we use a static panel based on annual data over the period
1992-2003. In the first stage we run plain OLS estimation, detecting het-
eroschedasticity in the residuals. Then, we apply Estimated GLS, assuming
that the error terms have components specific to each unit. This makes for
a variance - covariance matrix with a clear block-diagonal structure that can
be derived by the estimation of a small number of parameters.
The test is conducted for a group of countries made up of Indonesia,
Malaysia, Philippines, India, Sri Lanka, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay,
Uruguay, Venezuela, Egypt, Jordan.
The results of the econometric tests are summarized in Table 1 below.
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Table 1
Method Pooled EGLS
Observations 238
Dependent var.: SPR
coefficient Std. error t-stat. prob.
Explan. var.s
INFL .41 .20 2.07 .04
NFDI / GDPN -1.07 .31 -3.45 .00
GRMON .34 .11 3.25 .00
TRES / EXDB -8.77 3.24 -2.70 .01
DLog(TOT−1) -16.15 7.59 -2.12 .03
CAR−1 -.39 .20 -1.91 .06
DLATAM 14.63 2.36 6.20 .00
DLog(GDPR−1) -6.84 37.69 -.18 .86
R2 0.425 Mean dep. var. 20.63
Adj. R2 0.39 S.D. dep. var. 22.35
S.E.of regression 17.40 Akaike info crit. 8.59
Sum squared resid. 69305.41 Schwarz crit. 8.72
Log Likelihood -1012.91 D.B. stat. .42
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COMMENTS
From Table 1 we draw inferences as to the role of FDI and other variables
in the explanation of SPR.
FDI plays the expected role reducing SPR - the dependent variable - which
is the signal of stress in ED. The weight and significance of the coefficient
confirm our theoretical prior that FDI helps a country to make ED lighter.
Expected signs show up in estimated coefficients of other variables. This
is the case of the degree of international liquidity: the more liquid an economy
is in terms of foreign exchange reserves, the lower is SPR.
Inflation contributes to SPR since it provides the nominal wedge between
the interest rates of countries. Moreover, a looser monetary policy increases
SPR as the coefficient of GRMON indicates. This result may seem odd at
first sight. However, a larger money supply may lower real interest rates
while increasing nominal interest rates in emerging countries with inflation.
Here, we are indeed concerned with SPR between nominal interest rates.
Our result confirm that in emerging countries loose monetary policies have
increased SPR with respect to US rates.
Significant and relevant is the regional dummy whose high positive co-
efficient proves that Latin America is perceived as more risky and suffers a
higher SPR than other regions.
The sign of the delayed TOT is at first sight puzzling. However, the
association between a lower price of exports relatively to imports and a higher
SPR is the result of exchange rates variations mirrored in the TOT. An
exchange rate devaluation makes for lower export prices and higher import
prices and it is associated to larger SPR.
Finally, the worse is the CA the higher is SPR. A result which confirms
canonic priors.
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3.2 TEST 2
In the second test reported in Table 2 we turn to an enlarged sample of
countries. The previous group is supplemented by Eastern Europe. Some
countries now belong to enlarged EU as from May 2004. Our investigation
is not affected since the time span is 1992-2003. New entries in the sample
are Bulgaria, Russia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,
Slovakia, Slovenia.
Here we introduce fixed effects. The different sample and estimation
method lead to a fresh specification with some changes in the explanatory
variables. FDI is now utilized relatively to the CA balance, both measured
in local currency (NFDI / CAL). We also add the variable DLog(XN) which
stands for rate of growth of the value of exports at current prices. Finally
we use a constant (C) as the estimation is carried out with fixed effects.
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Table 2
Method Pooled EGLS Fixed effects
Observations 358
Dep.var.: SPR
coefficient Std. error t-stat prob.
Explan. var.s
INFL .21 .09 2.18 .03
NFDI / CAL -.04 .01 -2.19 .03
GRMON .19 .05 4.01 .00
DLog (XN) -7.25 2.18 -3.33 .00
DLog (GDPR) -.37 .23 -1.56 .11
CAR−1 -.03 .04 -.76 .45
C 18.68 5.33 3.50 .00
R2 0.83 Mean dep. var. 44.99
Adj. R2 0.81 S.D. dep. var. 44.46
S.E.of regression 21.12 D.B. stat. 1.01
Sum squared resid. 143218.2 F - stat. 42.29
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COMMENTS
With a sample containing also emerging European countries results change
slightly, while the effect of FDI on SPR maintains the expected sign. New
variables, like exports, improve data fit.10 All previous variables keep their
sign, yet with different significance. This is the case of the CA balance (CAR)
that is losing grip, crowded out by Exports.
As a partial conclusion, the role of FDI in the explanation of the suffer-
ance signal (SPR) is still crucial, proving our theoretical supposition. The
extension to Eastern Europe means that FDI improves sustainability of ED
also in areas which are more integrated and financially close to the EU.11
10The marked improvement in the R2 is due to both the different set of regressors chosen
and to the use of fixed effects.
11The same analysis we are conducting for emerging countries cannot be carried out in
Euroland, since the SPR is quite compressed by the collateral policies of the ECB that
tends to equalize interest rates all across the Euro area (see Buiter and Sibert, 2005).
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3.3 TEST 3
Here we consider a different sample of countries grouped according to their
presumed similarity as far as the role of FDI in financing CA imbalances is
concerned. We keep the economies of Test 2 excluding those belonging to
Middle East and Asia.
The rationale lies in macroeconomic affinities existing between Latin
America and Eastern Europe, concerning external variables. Moreover, Latin
America has gone through a transition, during the 1990s, similar to East-
ern Europe, from highly regulated and protected (sometimes semi-autarkic)
structures to quite open and flexible markets.
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Table 3
Method Pooled EGLS Fixed effects
Observations 252
Dep. var.: SPR
coefficient Std. error t-stat prob.
Expl. var.s
C 20.37 4.39 4.63 .00
INFL .21 .05 4.44 .00
NFDI / GDPN -.07 .03 -2.45 .01
GRMON .32 .06 4.81 .00
DLog(GDPR) -85.06 22.55 -3.77 .00
DLog (TOT) 1.39 8.28 .16 .87
CAR -.19 .24 -.77 .44
NFALC/GDPLC 4.20 11.97 .35 .73
R2 0.81 Mean dep var 50.02
Adj. R2 0.79 SD dep var 50.71
S.E.of regression 24.93 prob (F-stat) .00
Sum squared resid 136688.7
F-stat 30.76 DB stat 1.21
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Here we have a new variable: net financial assets over GDP at current
local prices. Changing the set of explanatory variables and a more targeted
sample with countries displaying more homogeneous behavior does not elim-
inate the influence of FDI. The coefficient has the expected sign. In all cases
FDI seems to reassure markets with a positive influence on the reduction of
SPR.
The inclusion of fixed effects, changed specification and different sample
may alter the importance of FDI as an inverse determinant of SPR. Nonethe-
less, the influence is always significant and of the expected sign.
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4 Epilogue
The aim is to reassess the role of equity, proxied by FDI, on ED. Equities
appear in two sections of the FA of the BOP. Equity inflows finance the CA
deficit of an economy as any other inflow of financial assets. Unlike other
financial assets, equity does not contribute to ED, as dictates the Interna-
tional code for the compilation of external accounts. In the extreme case, a
country can run CA deficits for ever without worsening its ED, if it can sell
a sufficient amount of equity to foreigners.
This taxonomy is no fiction and comes from the very nature of equity sold
to foreigners which represent pieces of an economy which are the property of
nonresidents.
We add some flesh to this statement by showing theoretically and em-
pirically that markets regard equity, and its proxy FDI, as a special “asset”
without a definite obligation to pay back the holder. Equity reduces the
amount of resources a country has to give to foreigners via Trade Balance
surpluses to reimburse ED.
The empirical proof comes from three tests on panels of emerging coun-
tries during “hot” 1990s. In all tests FDI net inflows reduce SPR between
lending rates of US and emerging countries. SPR is a widely used indicator
of distress of the external position and risk of a country. Differences appear
according to the sample we consider.
When Latin America and Asia are included we notice a strong effect of
FDI on the reduction of SPR. Latin America suffered larger idiosyncratic
SPR due to weak financial system. In this sense similarities with Eastern
Europe emerge (Test 3). Both areas, during the 1990s, have undergone a
transition process which turned them from quite closed and regulated into
financially open economies, increasingly integrated with the rest of the world.
Further variables affect SPR. Their coefficients mostly behave in an or-
thodox manner. None of them crowds out or reverses the expected effect of
FDI on the SPR.
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